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The Microsoft Case 10 Years Later:  
Antitrust and New Leading  




¶1 As the end of the 20th century approached, commentators began to recognize that 
the dramatic technological advancements that occurred throughout the century gave rise 
to new market environments that were distinct from traditional industries in that they 
were built around information, networks, and knowledge.1  The industries that drive the 
new market environments are anchored in the production of information goods such as 
software, content, or expertise.2  Primary examples of such new industries are the 
manufacture of software, Internet-based businesses, as well as communications 
equipment and services designed to support them.3
¶2 While information goods, such as music and books, have existed for quite some 
time, the pervasiveness achieved by these goods towards the end of the 20
 
th century was 
unprecedented.4  More traditional industries are generally characterized by: multi-plant 
and multiform production, stable markets, heavy capital investment, modest rates of 
innovation, and slow and infrequent entry and exit.5  Conversely, the new industries that 
evolved are characterized by: negligible marginal costs, value-based pricing, a focus on 
intellectual property protection, modest capital requirements, very high rates of 
innovation, quick and frequent entry and exit, consumer lock-in effects, and network 
effects providing for economies of scale in consumption.6  More concisely, the principal 
output of new industries is intellectual property, whereas the principal output of 
traditional industries is physical goods.7  Because of the marked difference between the 
economic characteristics that define the traditional industries and those that define the 
new industries, the new industries in the aggregate are often referred to as the “new 
economy.”8
 
* J.D. Candidate 2010, Northwestern University School of Law.  Special thanks to my wife, Laura, for 
her support and encouragement.   
1 Note, Antitrust and the Information Age: Section 2 Monopolization Analyses in the New Economy, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 1623, 1627 (2001) [hereinafter Antitrust and the Information Age]. 
2 Id. at 1628. 
3 See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925 (2000). 
4 Antitrust and the Information Age, supra note 1, at 1628. 
5 Posner, supra note 3, at 2. 
6 Id.; see also Antitrust and the Information Age, supra note 1, at 1627-1633 (describing the “market 
realities of the new economy”). 
7 Posner, supra note 3, at 2. 
 
8 See id. at 1.  Some specific characteristics of new economy industries are further discussed below in 
relation to antitrust considerations; however, a more thorough discussion of the economics of new economy 
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¶3 As the new economy became more pervasive, many questioned whether market 
regulations that evolved around the traditional economy made sense when applied to the 
new economy.9  The Microsoft Antitrust case, which started in 1997 and eventually 
settled in 2000, brought this consideration to the attention of not only academics and 
legal professionals, but the public as a whole.10  In the case, the government alleged that 
Microsoft had used its technology to maintain an illegal monopoly.11
¶4 In the decade following the Microsoft Case, other new economy firms emerged and 
experienced rapid growth similar to the growth that characterized Microsoft’s success.  
While many of the general characteristics of these firms are analogous to Microsoft, the 
new generation of firms is not surprisingly built around innovative technologies that give 
rise to even still unforeseen regulatory considerations.   
   At the time, 
Microsoft was the largest and most pre-eminent of the new economy firms, and the 
antitrust case was the first to highlight the question of whether traditional antitrust 
regulation would promote the public good when applied to new economy firms.  Now, 
ten years later, the Microsoft antitrust case remains an important consideration with 
respect to antitrust law in the new economy.   
¶5 The remainder of this paper will identify dominant theories of antitrust analysis in 
the new economy.  This paper will also summarize the Microsoft case to highlight key 
take-aways that can be used to analyze concerns for new leading new economy firms 
(hereinafter “New Generation Firms”).  Two New Generation Firms, Google and 
Facebook, will then be analyzed for similarities to and differences from Microsoft.  A 
discussion of potential antitrust concerns for these two firms will be used as a 
springboard to discuss the state of antitrust regulation of the new economy as technology 
and the new economy continue to evolve.  Such a discussion will make clear that much of 
the scholarship and commentary that was developed around the Microsoft case, though 
mindful of the unique characteristics of new economy firms, did not provide an 
exhaustive analysis of potential antitrust issues of continually evolving New Generation 
Firms. 
¶6 In closing, this paper suggests that regulatory bodies and courts applying antitrust 
law to new economy firms should consciously look beyond the technologies underlying 
the antitrust concerns in order to effectively foster competition.  The mere perspective 
that a definable new economy has evolved is insufficient to effectively regulate 
 
firms is outside the scope of this piece.  For a more thorough discussion, see RICHARD L. GORDON, 
ANTITRUST ABUSE IN THE NEW ECONOMY 12-49 (Edward Elgar 2002). 
9 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 3, at 1 (“[C]oncern has been expressed recently that U.S. antitrust law 
may not be well suited to regulating the ‘new economy.’”); see generally Nicholas Economides, United 
States v. Microsoft: A Failure of Antitrust in The New Economy, 32 UWLA L. REV. 3 (2001), available at 
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/UWLA.pdf. 
10 Even the day-to-day of the case was covered extensively by the popular media.  See GORDON, supra 
note 8, at 75-78 (noting that “[a]t least three book-length journalistic accounts appeared”).  The New York 
Times, Wired and The New Yorker all published books based on their articles.  See also Rajiv 
Chandrasekaran, Microsoft Attacks Credibility of Intel Executive, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1998, at B1, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/business/longterm/microsoft/stories/1998/microsoft111398.htm; Joel Brinkley & Steve Lohr, Pricing at 
Issue as U.S. Finishes Microsoft Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1999, at C1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/06/business/pricing-at-issue-as-us-finishes-microsoft-case.html; Declan 
McCullagh, Microsoft Judge Ripped in Court, WIRED NEWS, Feb. 28, 2001, available at 
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2001/02/42071. 
11 GORDON, supra note 8, at 1. 
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continually evolving high-technology firms.  The lesson to learn is not that the economy 
has simply been changed by technology, but that the economy will continually change 
because of technology, especially with respect to the concerns that govern antitrust 
regulation. 
 
II. A DISCUSSION OF ANTITRUST IN THE NEW ECONOMY  
¶7 The recognition that market regulation of new economy firms might be sub-optimal 
under traditional regulation approaches resulted in commentary on how the regulation of 
new economy firms should vary from the regulation of traditional firms.  Much of this 
commentary focused on antitrust regulation in the new economy.  In particular, two 
individuals directly involved in the Microsoft Antitrust case, Judge Richard Posner and 
Professor Lawrence Lessig, have been instrumental voices in the analysis of antitrust in 
the new economy. 
A. Richard Posner and the New Economy 
¶8 U.S. District Court Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson, presiding over the Microsoft 
case, appointed Judge Richard Posner, currently a judge on the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, to act as a mediator in the Microsoft case.12  Many 
recognize Judge Posner as having shaped antitrust policy in the second half of the 
twentieth century and acknowledge his “godlike stature on antitrust law.”13  He has been 
harshly critical of the aggressive antitrust laws of the 1960s, and holds the view that 
breaking up monopolies is not always either necessary or appropriate.14  His views on 
antitrust are indicative, if not representative, of the “Chicago school’s” view of antitrust, 
and accordingly represent a prevailing view on antitrust.15  After his involvement with the 
Microsoft case, Judge Posner explicitly wrote his views of antitrust law in the new 
economy.16
¶9 Judge Posner is not primarily concerned that the application of traditional antitrust 
laws to new economy firms is insufficient in and of itself.
 
17  Instead, his concern is that 
the institutional structure of enforcement of traditional antitrust laws is incapable of 
handling the unusually difficult questions of fact that arise as a result of the technical 
complexity of the products and services produced in new economy industries.18
 
12 Joel Brinkley, Microsoft Case Gets US Judge as a Mediator, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1999, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/20/business/microsoft-case-gets-us-judge-as-a-mediator.html. 
13 Roger Parloff, The Negotiator, FORTUNE, Jan. 10, 2000, available at 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2000/01/10/271747/index.htm. 
14 Brinkley, supra note 12. 
15 Judge Posner points out that while the Chicago school is “skeptical . . . about the danger to 
competition that is posed by unilateral firm action,” the Chicago school emphasizes “the danger that heavy-
handed antitrust enforcement [in the case of unilateral firm action] may suppress a practice that may seem 
anticompetitive but actually is efficient, or at least neutral, from the broader social standpoint.” Posner, 
supra note 3, at 8.  
16 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 3; RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 245-258 (2d ed. 2001). 
17 Posner, supra note 3, at 11. 
18 Id. 
  Highly 
technical questions can be expected to be central in antitrust cases in the new economy, 
as new economy firms might exercise or achieve monopoly control by technical 
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modifications to products.19  Judge Posner also points to the institutional implication of 
rapid innovation in the new economy.  The mismatch between “law time” (how long it 
takes to try a case) and “new-economy real time” is troubling because litigation of 
antitrust cases in the new economy might drag on for so long that the conditions of the 
industry might ultimately become irrelevant, and the litigation itself might have 
devastating effects on the companies involved by making investment riskier and 
complicating business planning.20
¶10 While Judge Posner does not claim to have a definitive solution for these problems, 
he emphasizes the importance of having competent, neutral experts involved.
 
21  This 
emphasis recognizes and attempts to account for the fact-intensive nature of new 
economy antitrust cases.22  Much care must be taken with respect to both the technical 
inquiries and the less technical inquiries because the combination of intellectual property, 
network externalities, and rapid growth in consumer demand creates difficult questions 
involving the ascertainment and measurement of monopoly.23
B. Lawrence Lessig and the New Economy 
   
¶11 Professor Lawrence Lessig served as “special master” in the Microsoft Case and is 
a professor at Harvard Law School who has written extensively about regulation and 
policy with respect to technology issues.24  Professor Lessig is the founder of Stanford’s 
Center for Internet and Society, leader of the Free Culture movement, and is widely 
recognized as the most original thinker in cyberlaw.25  Like Judge Posner, he generally 
promotes open markets.26  Notably, he is skeptical of the ability of companies in the new 
economy to use technology to stifle competition.27  On one hand, Professor Lessig is 
wary of the Government’s involvement in many core new economy issues, such as 
extension of copyright.28  On the other hand, contrary to Judge Posner, he believes that 
traditional antitrust law is insufficient to handle issues arising from the use of technology 
in the new economy and that the Government should have structured regulations in place 
to prevent companies from using technology to inhibit competition.29
 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 14. 
21 Posner, supra note 3, at 12, 15. 
22 Id. at 14 (“The peculiarities of new-economy markets . . . are apt to make the trial of a new-economy 
case a daunting challenge to the fact-finding capacity of the judiciary.”). 
23 Posner, supra note 3, at 12-13. 
24 Steven Levy, Lawrence Lessig’s Supreme Court Showdown, WIRED, Oct. 2002, available at 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/10.10/lessig_pr.html.  “As special master, Lessig was given the power 
to gather information independently, examine witnesses, and evaluate technical data, all with the authority 
of the court. Then he would produce his own report and recommendations, which theoretically would 
provide a blueprint for Judge Jackson's eventual ruling and remedy.”  Id. 
25 Timothy J. Mullaney, The Paul Revere of the Web: Harvard’s Lessig warns of threats to speech and 
innovation, BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 6, 2000, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/2000/00_10/b3671138.htm; Levy, supra note 24.   
26 Mullaney, supra note 25. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Brief of Lawrence Lessig as Amicus Curiae at the Court’s Request at 27, United States v. Microsoft 
Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. Feb. 1 2000), available at http://www.lessig.org/content/testimony/ab/ab.pdf 
[hereinafter Brief of Lawrence Lessig]. 
  Professor Lessig’s 
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extensive writings on technology law, including a brief he prepared as special master for 
the Microsoft case, illuminate this alternative view of antitrust in the new economy.30
¶12 Professor Lessig is particularly concerned with the potential for “tying,” the focus 
of most of his brief.
 
31  Professor Lessig notes that “[e]specially in a newly emerging 
market, it is sensible to hesitate before condemning a market practice, at least until it has 
been shown convincingly that that practice is anticompetitive.”32  He also points out that, 
“the Supreme Court has indicated that it is ‘far too late in the history of our antitrust 
jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an 
unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore are unreasonable per se.’”33
¶13  In performing antitrust analyses with respect to software, a primary new economy 
industry, Professor Lessig advocated that courts should focus on the software’s 
functionality and value to the customer in order to avoid evaluating code and 
understanding what it does.
   
34  This would presumably facilitate a more traditional 
antitrust analysis, given the more surface level analysis of the product.  However, 
Professor Lessig did not go so far as to claim that new economy antitrust analysis should 
be treated traditionally; rather, he requested that the court “craft a standard that makes 
sense of the values in antitrust law and of the peculiar facts about software.”35
¶14  Ultimately, Professor Lessig believes antitrust law should be just as skeptical of 
tying via software as it is of tying using more traditional means, such as via contract; 
otherwise companies may simply be incentivized to achieve the tying through technology 
instead of contract.
 
36  With Professor Lessig’s attempt to keep the court’s focus “above 
the hood,” he advocates a “new product rationale” modified for the new economy, 
whereby a company will be found to not have engaged in illegal activity if two software 
products are combined together to operate in a new way.37
  
 
III. THE MICROSOFT ANTITRUST CASE 
¶15 The Microsoft Antitrust case provides for an illustrative demonstration of issues 
arising with antitrust analysis in the new economy, with such issues being the focus of 
most of the associated commentary and legal analysis.  The following discussion 
provides a brief history of the Microsoft Corporation, a brief introduction to the case 
 
30 See generally id. 
31 Id.  For a discussion of the tying aspects of the Microsoft case, see infra Part III.C.2. 
32 Brief of Lawrence Lessig, supra note 29, at 6. 
33 Id. at 7. 
34 Id. at 22.  It is interesting to note that, in this way, both Judge Posner and Professor Lessig recognize 
the burden that the heavily technical inquiries of new economy antitrust cases might place on the judiciary.  
While Professor Lessig suggests an end-run around the problem, Judge Posner suggests utilizing neutral 
experts.  See supra Part II.A. 
35 Brief of Lawrence Lessig, supra note 29, at 26.  Thus, whereas Professor Lessig urges the Court to 
adopt a new standard within antitrust doctrine for the new economy, Judge Posner emphasizes the 
sufficiency of antitrust doctrine to deal with problems that the new economy presents.  See supra Part II.A. 
36 Brief of Lawrence Lessig, supra note 29, at 28 (“While antitrust law is generally encouraging of 
technology-based tying efficiencies, and skeptical of claims of contract-based tying efficiencies, the bolting 
achieved through software has no necessary relationship to efficiency . . . but if the law is especially 
forgiving of one method of bundling over another — if it, for example, scrutinizes bundles achieved 
through contract more strictly that it scrutinizes bundles achieved through code — then the effect of this 
rule may be to tilt the architecture of software towards software bundling rather than contract bundling.”). 
37 Id. at 39. 
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basics, a summary of the allegations against Microsoft, and a summary of the case’s 
outcome. 
A. The History of the Microsoft Corporation  
¶16 The Microsoft Corporation was founded in 1975 by Bill Gates and, with the 
aggressive marketing of MS-DOS, quickly became a major software vendor in the home 
computer industry.38  In 1985, Microsoft released its first version of Microsoft Windows, 
and then quickly expanded its software offerings to include Microsoft Office in 1989, a 
business operating system with Windows NT 3.1 in 1993, and a web browser with 
Internet Explorer (hereinafter “IE”) in 1995.39  Microsoft has also expanded its product 
line into the World Wide Web with MSN (Microsoft Network) in 1995, and personal 
gaming with the Xbox in 2002.40
¶17 Major early releases of Windows for personal computing were Windows 3.0 in 
1990, Windows 3.1 in 1992, and Windows 95.
   
41  When Windows 95 was first released, 
IE 1.0 was available in the Plus! Add-on pack, which was a separate product.42  When 
Windows 95 OEM Service Release 1 was released, it included IE 2.0.43
B. Microsoft Case Basics  
  
¶18 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was investigating Microsoft as early as June 
of 1990 for possible collusion with IBM in the PC software market.44  In July 1994, 
Microsoft signed a consent decree that forbade the company from using its operating 
system dominance to stifle competition.45  Then, on May 18, 1998 ,the Justice 
Department filed an antitrust suit alleging that Microsoft had abused its market power to 
thwart competition, including Netscape.46  After a complex series of events, the Justice 
Department ultimately settled the case with Microsoft in November of 2002.47
¶19 On June 7, 2000, district court Judge Jackson ordered the breakup of Microsoft, 




38 Fast Facts About Microsoft, http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/inside_ms.mspx (last visited Apr. 
11, 2010). 
39 Id.; see also Sandy Hardmeier, The History of Internet Explorer, 
http://www.microsoft.com/windows/ie/community/columns/historyofie.mspx (last visited Apr. 11, 2010). 
40 Fast Facts About Microsoft, supra note 38. 
41 Microsoft, The History of Computing Project, 
http://www.thocp.net/companies/microsoft/microsoft_company.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2010).  More 
recent versions of Windows include 98, M.E., 2000, X.P, and Vista. Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id.  






  The discussion of the Microsoft case that 
follows focuses on the legal analysis that resulted in the break up order and the appellate 
court’s reversal. 
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C. Sherman Act Section 1 Allegations 
¶20 Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes illegal “[e]very contract, combination in the 
form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.”49  The 
government’s allegations under section 1 of the Sherman Act alleged Microsoft had 
entered into exclusive contracts with various parties and had tied IE to Windows.50  The 
government abandoned its claims under section 1 after unfavorable review at the 
appellate level.51
1. Exclusive Contracts 
 
¶21 The focus of the government’s exclusive contracts allegations was that Microsoft 
had prevented the distribution of Netscape’s competing Web browser.52  This argument 
was unsuccessful at the district court level because of Netscape’s continued expansion 




¶22 Tying is essentially a contract conditioning the purchase of one product (the tying 
product) on the purchase of another (the tied product).54  Tying violations are found 
where (1) two separate products are involved; (2) the defendant forces its customers to 
take the tied product to obtain the tying product; (3) the arrangement affects a substantial 
volume of interstate commerce; and (4) the defendant has market power in the tying 
product market.55  The government argued that Microsoft was guilty of tying because IE 
and Windows were perceived as two distinct products by consumers, Netscape had 
experienced a drop in revenues resulting in a substantial effect on commerce, and 
Microsoft had market power in Windows.56  Ultimately, however, the appeals court 
required that the government also show that the harm to competition in the Web browser 
market outweighed the benefit of integrating a browser into the operating system.57
 
49 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
50 David S. Evans, Introduction, in MICROSOFT, ANTITRUST AND THE NEW ECONOMY: SELECTED 
ESSAYS 1, 4 (David S. Evans ed., 2002). 
51 The exclusive contracts claim was rejected by the district court and the government did not seek 
reversal on appeal. Id. at 5.  The appeals court remanded the tying claims for analysis under a much more 
difficult “rule of reason” analysis and the government decided not to retry. Id. at 5-6. 
52 Id. at 4. 
53 Id.; see also Mark Geier, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 297, 312 (2001). 
54 Geier, supra note 53, at 308. 
55 Id. 
56 Evans, supra note 50, at 5.  Under a Jefferson Parish analysis, a tie is illegal on its face if (a) there are 
two distinct products; (b) the defendant requires customers to take the tied product as a condition of 
obtaining the tying product; (c) the arrangement affects a significant volume of commerce; and (d) the 
defendant has market power in the tying product. Geier, supra note 53, at 308, 311. 
57 Evans, supra note 50, at 5.  In the district court, the government argued that Microsoft violated the 
antitrust law according to the Jefferson Parish Test.  However, the appeals court applied the “rule of 
reason” which additionally requires a showing of net harm. Id. 
  The 
government itself noted many benefits of inclusion of a Web browser with an operating 
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system, and dropped the claim when faced with the significant hurdle of demonstrating 
that the tying caused more harm than good.58
D. Sherman Act Section 2 Allegations 
 
¶23 Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it illegal for “[e]very person who shall 
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or 
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations.”59  To establish a section 2 violation, the government must prove: 
(1) the possession of monopoly power and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of 
that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior 
product, business acumen, or historic accident.60  Defining the relevant market and then 
assessing the defendant’s power to control prices or exclude competition from that 
market is central to a court’s analysis.61  Generally, the relevant market will include all 
possible substitutes for the defendant’s product as perceived by the buyer.62
¶24 The government did not claim that Microsoft obtained a monopoly of operating 
systems unlawfully, but that Microsoft attempted to illegally maintain its operating 
system monopoly and to obtain a monopoly in Web browsers.
 
63  The government’s case 
comprised a variety of allegations meant to demonstrate a series of anticompetitive 
behavior, summarized below.64
1. The Relevant Market 
 
¶25 In arguing that Microsoft enjoyed monopoly power, the government adopted a 
“malleable definition of the relevant market.”65  During the liability phase of the trial, the 
government argued that the relevant market was operating systems for Intel-compatible 
personal computers.66  However, during the liability phase of the trial, the government 
argued that the relevant market was centered more broadly on platforms including, for 
example, applications running on servers.67  Microsoft argued that the relevant market 
more closely tracked the latter, pointing out that Microsoft’s interests were in being the 
preferred platform for applications generally, and that anything that would attract 
developers away from Windows is competition.68
 
58 Id. at 6. For example, other software developers can depend on the presence of a web browser when it 
is integrated with an operating system and develop accordingly. Id. 
59 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
60 Geier, supra note 53, at 305. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Evans, supra note 50, at 6.   
64 Id. at 9.  Other allegations, for example, monopoly leveraging and attempted monopolization of web 
browsers, failed. See Geier, supra note 53, at 307; Evans, supra note 50, at 7. 
65 Kenneth D. Elzinga, David S. Evans & Albert L. Nichols, U.S. v. Microsoft Corp.: Remedy or 





  Given that the court adopted the 
narrower market definition, and because Windows clearly was run on more than ninety 
Vol. 8:2] Chris Butts 
 283 
percent of all PCs, it is unsurprising that the district court also concluded that “Microsoft 
enjoys monopoly power in the relevant market.”69
¶26 It is worth noting, however, that there has been considerable commentary asserting 
that this conclusion is erroneous.
    
70  In particular, there is much evidence that Microsoft 
did not price Windows at monopoly prices and otherwise behaved as though it was in a 
competitive market.71  Such facts support the conclusion that the relevant market was 
actually broader.72  At the very least, the distinction makes clear that traditional market 
definitions in high technology industries may be difficult to define.73
2. Suppression of Netscape Distribution 
   
¶27 The district court agreed with the government’s charge that distribution and 
installation agreements Microsoft made with internet access providers (IAPs), 
independent software vendors (ISVs), and internet content providers (ICPs) were 
exclusionary.74  However, the appeals court only affirmed a few of those findings 
including that Microsoft had imposed restrictions that made it less likely that Netscape 
would be distributed through the OEMs and IAPs.75  Although it is likely that these 
agreements had little actual effect on the browser wars, or the operating system market, 
there was little efficiency justification for them.76
3. Tying/Bundling 
  
¶28 The appeals court accepted the district court’s findings that Microsoft had taken 
actions that made it difficult for OEMs and end users to hide access to the IE integrated 
with Windows.77  Specifically, the appeals court accepted the findings that (1) 
comingling of code specific to Web browsing with code that supplies operating system 
functions, (2) failing to include IE in the Add/Remove Programs utility in Windows, and 
(3) prohibiting OEMs from deleting certain items from the desktop and Start menu did 
make it harder for consumers to choose Netscape Navigator.78  In other words, the 




70 David S. Evans, Albert L. Nichols & Rischard Schmalensee, An Analysis of the Government’s 
Economic Case in U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., in MICROSOFT, ANTITRUST AND THE NEW ECONOMY: SELECTED 
ESSAYS 23, 45 (David S. Evans ed., 2002). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 See infra Part IV.A. 
74 Evans, supra note 50, at 9; WILLIAM HEPBURN PAGE & JOHN E. LOPATKA, THE MICROSOFT CASE: 
ANTITRUST, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, AND CONSUMER WELFARE 167 (2007). 
75 Evans, supra note 50, at 9. 
76 PAGE & LOPATKA, supra note 74, at 184. 
77 Evans, supra note 50, at 10. 
78 Id. at 10; PAGE & LOPATKA, supra note 74, at 141, 146.  
79 PAGE & LOPATKA, supra note 74, at 141. 
  In the end, the courts recognized that Microsoft’s prevention of 
unbundling caused little harm because users could still install other browsers.  
Nonetheless, Microsoft’s behavior was deemed anticompetitive because it was reasonable 
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to conclude that Netscape’s usage share had been limited without providing benefits to 
consumers.80
4. Predatory Pricing and Investment 
 
¶29 The government claimed that Microsoft gave up profits for the purpose of 
maintaining its monopoly in Windows.81  Not only did Microsoft not charge consumers 
for IE directly, but it also did not charge Internet service provider (ISP) and IAP firms 
who distributed IE separately from Windows.  Microsoft also provided other IE related 
services to ISPs, free of charge.82  In this way, Microsoft was arguably adhering to a 
traditional form of predation by selling (or in this case giving away) IE at a price point 
below incremental or avoidable cost in an attempt to drive competitors out of business 
and then benefit from its maintained monopoly.83  However, the core of such a predation 
charge relied on a novel argument that by pricing IE below cost, Microsoft was able to 
simultaneously preserve its stream of monopoly profits on Windows, and thereby more 
than recoup its investment in below-cost pricing of IE.84
¶30 The appeals court did not uphold any findings of predatory pricing, noting that they 
had “no warrant to condemn Microsoft for offering either IE . . . free of charge or even at 
a negative price . . . a monopolist does not violate the Sherman Act simply by developing 
an attractive product.”
 
85  However, it is important to recognize the predatory pricing 
allegations because they greatly informed the appeals court’s analysis of the Netscape 
distribution suppression claims.86
E. Case Outcome 
 
¶31 On June 7, 2000, the district court essentially adopted the government’s proposal 
that Microsoft be divided into two firms, one limited to operating systems and one 
limited to applications.87  A variety of conduct orders were also a part of the judgment.88  
However, the district court’s order was reversed and remanded by the appeals court, 
largely due to procedural failures, lack of explanation of how the order would restore 
competition, and the need to reconsider remedies in light of the reversal of some of the 
liability holdings.89





80 Id. at 148. 
81 Evans, supra note 50, at 10. 
82 PAGE & LOPATKA, supra note 74, at 49. Microsoft gave ISPs a valuable set of software tools for 
installing and maintaining IE on their Web servers. See Evans, supra note 50, at 10-11.    
83 Economides, supra note 9, at 26. 
84 PAGE & LOPATKA, supra note 74, at 49; Economides, supra note 9, at 26; Evans, supra note 50, at 10. 
85 Evans, supra note 50, at 11; see also PAGE & LOPATKA, supra note 60, at 50. 
86 PAGE & LOPATKA, supra note 74, at 48.  Page and Lopatka point out that the Court considered that 
free software could be offered “in an effort to build usage share and thus preserve the applications barrier.” 
Id. at n.119.  The suppression of Netscape distribution allegation is discussed infra Part III.D.1. 
87 PAGE & LOPATKA, supra note 74, at 70. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 71. 
90 Id. at 72. 
  The agreement included conduct-based remedies directed to the practices 
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held unlawful by the appeals court and limited Microsoft’s ability to counter rivals’ 
competing products.91  For example, the agreement prevented Microsoft from entering 
into exclusive distribution contracts, offering selective price cuts to individual computer 
manufacturers, restricting computer manufacturers from modifying the appearance of the 
Windows desktop in prescribed ways, and requiring Microsoft to disclose information 
about its operating system products to help competitors design their own products.92
  
 
IV. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF NEW LEADING NEW ECONOMY FIRMS 
¶33 The behaviors under scrutiny in the Microsoft case and the terms of the settlement 
deal provide some practical insight into antitrust considerations for modern new economy 
firms.  However, just 10 years after the Microsoft case, new generation firms are built 
around technologies that are unique in many ways from the software that was at issue in 
the Microsoft Case.   
¶34 As the internet has continued to expand and become more pervasive, more and 
more companies have looked to it as a foundation for building computing platforms, as 
Microsoft used the PC as a foundation for Windows.93
A. Google 
  Currently, two of the most 
popular companies taking such an approach to the internet are Google and Facebook. 
¶35 Google was founded on September 8, 1998 by Larry Page and Sergey Brin while 
graduate students at Stanford University.94  The search engine quickly grew in popularity 
and by the time the company went public in August of 2004, Google had over 800 
employees and had over 6 billion items indexed for searching, including 4.28 billion web 
pages and 880 million images.95  Google.com is visited by about 40% of global internet 
users daily and is the most visited site on the internet.96  YouTube.com, Google’s popular 
video sharing website, is visited by about 20% of global internet users daily and is the 
third most visited site on the internet.97
¶36 Today Google is much more than a search engine, offering a wide variety of 
computer and web-based applications and services including Gmail, a popular email 
service; Google Chrome, a popular web browser; and YouTube.
   
98
 
91 Id.; see also Evans, supra note 50, at 14. 
92 Evans, supra note 50, at 14. 
93 See, e.g., Willy Chui, Platform Internet: The Promise of Grid Computing, TECHNEWSWORLD, Aug. 
29, 2003, http://www.technewsworld.com/story/31456.html (“The resources we desire will be at our 
fingertips, but they will reside on the Internet rather than in single computers or on local servers.”). 
94 Corporate Information – Google Milestones, http://www.google.com/corporate/history.html (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2010). 
95 Id. 
96 Google.com – Traffic Details from Alexa, 
http://www.alexa.com/data/details/traffic_details/google.com (last visited Apr. 11, 2010). 
97 YouTube.com – Traffic Details from Alexa, 
http://www.alexa.com/data/details/traffic_details/youtube.com (last visited Apr. 11, 2010). 
98 For a full list of Google products, see More Google Products, http://www.google.com/intl/en/options/ 
(last visited Apr. 11, 2010). 
98 For a full list of Google products, see id. 
  Google does not sell 
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any of these products, but rather generates revenue by including advertisements in the 
pages of many its web applications.99
1. Google: Antitrust Landscape 
   
¶37 Given Google’s extreme popularity on the Internet it is, perhaps, unsurprising that 
the Department of Justice has its eyes on it.100  In June of 2008, Google signed an “ad 
search pact” with another internet giant, Yahoo, in which Google would supply Yahoo 
with search ads.101  The deal would have provided increased revenue for Yahoo and 
would have also given Google more power in the online advertisement market; however, 
in November of 2008, the deal fell apart.102  Because the deal was between two 
technology giants that are otherwise direct competitors, the government stated they were 
concerned with the deal’s “competitive and privacy implications.”103  Ultimately, the 
Department of Justice threatened action against Google under Sherman Act section 2, 
which led to Google abandoning the deal rather than engaging in a “protracted legal 
battle.”104
¶38 Aside from the veto of the Google-Yahoo deal, the Department of Justice may be 
considering going after Google as a general monopolist.
 
105  In fact, Department of Justice 
lawyers involved with stopping the Yahoo deal have commented that Google’s current 
position may already constitute a monopoly, even without Yahoo.106  Google’s aggressive 
expansion has led many to question whether Google is the next Microsoft.107
2. Definition of the Relevant Market 
  A number 
of corollaries might be drawn to the Microsoft case to evaluate Google’s antitrust 
situation.  Specifically, Google has carved out a new product in online search advertising, 
and it will be difficult to determine what market is relevant to a determination of 
Google’s market power with respect to that product. 
¶39 When the Department of Justice stepped in to prevent the Google-Yahoo deal, the 
main motivation was that the deal would create a lock on a large percentage of the search 
 
99 Google Corporate Information – Company Overview, http://www.google.com/corporate/index.html 
(last visited Apr. 11, 2010). 
100 Charles Cooper, Trustbusters Divided on Next Move on Google, CNET, Sept. 11, 2008, 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-10787_3-10038613-60.html. 
101 Id. Yahoo is also one of the most visited sites on the internet.  Yahoo.com – Traffic Details from 
Alexa,  http://www.alexa.com/data/details/traffic_details/yahoo.com (last visited Apr. 11, 2010). 
102 Jessica E. Vascellaro & Nick Wingfield, Google Ditches Ad Pact With Yahoo, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 
2008, at B1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122589788640401601.html. 
103 Peter Whoriskey, Google-Yahoo Deal Raises Antitrust Fears, WASH. POST, June 14, 2008, at D01, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/13/AR2008061303494.html.. 
104 Fred Vogelstein, Why is Obama’s Top Antitrust Cop Gunning for Google?, WIRED, July 20, 2009, 
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/magazine/17-08/mf_googlopoly; Robert J. Samuelson, The Plot to Kill 
Google, WIRED, Jan. 19, 2009, http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/magazine/17-02/ff_killgoogle. 
105 Cooper, supra note 100. 
106  Samuelson, supra note 104.  See also John Packowski, Tired: Microsoft Antitrust, Wired: Google 
Antitrust, DIGITAL DAILY, Feb. 18, 2009, http://digitaldaily.allthingsd.com/20090218/tired-microsoft-
antitrust-wired-google-antitrust/. 
107 Declan McCullagh, On Antitrust, is Google the Next Microsoft?, ZDNET, July 23, 2007, 
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9588_22-152610.html. 
Vol. 8:2] Chris Butts 
 287 
advertising business.108  It has been estimated that Google had 70% of the search 
advertising market, while Yahoo had 20% of the search advertising market.109  
Interestingly, Microsoft itself led a campaign to convince the government, the advertising 
community, and the public generally that "important competition issues [were] raised by 
this transaction."110  Ultimately, the Department of Justice feared that the deal would give 
advertisers less leverage to negotiate ad rates, and that the advertisers would end up 
paying more.111
¶40 For the Department of Justice to arrive at that conclusion, however, it first had to 
decide that the relevant market was indeed search advertising (advertising directed to 
placing online advertisements on Web Pages that show results from search engine 
queries).  Arguably, this is a relatively narrow definition compared to other plausible 
market definitions such as online advertising as a whole or the advertising industry 
generally.
  
112  At the very least, it is clear that “[w]hether paid search constitutes a product 
in a larger advertising market or a market of its own remains a difficult question to 
answer.”113
¶41 It is pertinent to consider that merely including within the market definition other 
forms of online advertising would dramatically reduce Google’s market share.
 
114  For 
example, display advertising (advertising directed to the display of images or interactive 
media on standard web pages) is comparably as pervasive as search advertising, and 
Google only has about a 1.5% share of the display advertising market.115  It is important 
to pause and consider the reality that often, online forms of advertisement serve as 
substitutes for more traditional forms of advertisement such as print and TV.116  That is, 
advertisers often choose between different advertising media depending on their 
advertising goals.117  The substitutability of such advertising supports the proposition that 
the relevant market—the market Google truly competes with in online search 
advertising—is much broader than the online search advertising market itself.  Google’s 
recent foray into print advertising would also seem to support that proposition.118
 




112 Joseph Weisenthal, Yahoo-Google: Antitrust Outcome Hinges on Market Definition: Is it Search 
Ads? Online Ads?, PAIDCONTENT.ORG, June 17, 2008, http://www.paidcontent.org/entry/419-yahoo-
google-anti-trust-outcome-hinges-on-market-definition-search-ads-/. 
113 NORMAN HAWKER, THE AM. ANTITRUST INST., THE PROPOSED GOOGLE-YAHOO ALLIANCE 6 
(2008), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/files/AAI%20White%20Paper%20Google-
Yahoo.9.23.08_092320080913.pdf.   
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 See Scott Karp, Advertising Trend Ratio: A New Metric for Publishers, PUBLISHING 2.0, May 29, 
2007, http://publishing2.com/2007/05/29/advertising-trend-ratio-a-new-metric-for-publishers/ (suggesting 
that online and traditional advertisement are substitutes, and that an increase in expenditures in one form of 
advertisement leads to a decrease in expenditures in the other). 
117 Id. 
118 Saul Hansell, Newspapers to Test Plan to Sell Ads on Google, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2006, at C1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/06/business/media/06google.html. 
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3. Microsoft, Google-Yahoo, and how to Define the Relevant Market  
¶42 Narrow market definitions were ultimately outcome determinative in both the 
Microsoft case and the demise of the Google-Yahoo deal.  In both cases, the relevant 
markets were defined in very close relation to the underlying technology.  In the 
Microsoft case, the court defined the market as operating systems for Intel-compatible 
personal computers where the underlying technology was Microsoft’s extremely 
successful Windows operating system.119 In the Google-Yahoo deal, the Department of 
Justice defined the market as online search advertising where the underlying technology 
was Google’s extremely successful search-advertising technology.120
¶43 In both situations, it is clear that broader definitions of the markets were not only 
extremely plausible but likely correct.
 
121  The narrow market definition in each case, at 
the very least, may imply that the underlying technology influenced the determined 
definition of the market size.  Because market definitions are hard to determine, 
especially when analyzing new and evolving industries, courts and regulating bodies 
must be aware of this potential dependency on the underlying technology when analyzing 
new economy firms and be careful to define the market according to the true competitive 
landscape.122  Such an emphasis would have likely led to the markets being more broadly 




¶44 Facebook was founded in February of 2004 by Mark Zuckerberg while a student at 
Harvard University.124  Like Google, the social networking website has grown quickly 
and currently has over 100 million registered users.125  Facebook.com is the fifth most 
visited site on the internet and visited by about 12% of global internet users daily.126
¶45 At its core, Facebook is a social networking website.  However, with its 
introduction of Facebook Apps, it has become more of a platform for third parties to 
develop applications to run on Facebook, not dissimilar from the way that third parties 




119 See supra Part III.D.1. 
120 See supra Part IV.A.2. 
121 See supra Part III.D.1. 
122 This concept may be thought of as an extension of Judge Posner’s argument that traditional antitrust 
laws are generally sufficient to deal with new economy firms, so long as they are applied in a manner 
reflective of new economy market realities. See supra Part II.A. 
123 See supra Part II.A.  Such an approach would be consistent with Judge Posner’s deferential approach 
to antitrust enforcement. Id. 
124 Sarah Phillips, A Brief History of Facebook, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, July 25, 2007, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2007/jul/25/media.newmedia. 
125 Marshall Kirkpatrick, Facebook Hits 100 Million Users, READWRITEWEB, Aug. 25, 2008, 
http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/facebook_hits_100_million_user.php. 
126 Facebook.com – Traffic Details from Alexa, 
http://www.alexa.com/data/details/traffic_details/facebook.com (last visited Apr. 11, 2010). 
127 Facebook Application Directory, http://www.facebook.com/apps/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2010). 
  Facebook has even expanded to include 
applications for use on users’ desktop and other websites, making its platform an ever 
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increasing part of the personal computing experience.128  Zuckerberg has expressed a 
desire to dominate in the United States, with the goal of eclipsing Google in total amount 
of traffic.129
1. Facebook: Antitrust Landscape 
  
¶46 As Facebook becomes more popular, Facebook itself becomes more and more like 
Windows with third parties developing applications to be used on the Facebook platform.  
Third parties were and are inclined to develop products for Windows due to Windows’ 
pervasiveness and, in the same way, third party software developers are and will continue 
to be inclined to develop for Facebook in an effort to capture the greatest number of 
potential users.  This puts Facebook in a similar situation with potential to face the same 
sort of scrutiny as Microsoft. 
¶47   Facebook’s potential as a pervasive platform in and of itself does not raise 
potential antitrust concerns for Facebook.  Even Microsoft, at the time of its litigation, 
was not under fire simply for being the dominant platform.  However, being a dominant 
platform could give rise to situations where Facebook would arguably be using its 
monopoly power in the social networking platform to dominate other areas, similar to 
how Windows did with IE.   
¶48 Like Windows, Facebook is interested in protecting its platform as the preferred 
development platform.  However, unlike Microsoft, Facebook is not interested in doing 
so in an attempt to sell more copies of its platform.  After all, Facebook is free to use.  
Instead, Facebook is driven at least in-part by a desire to ensure the value of its user base, 
or proprietary information about that user base, for advertisers.  Although at the surface 
level, both Microsoft and Facebook are interested in protecting their vast user base, the 
subtle difference in motivation may give rise to different antitrust concerns. 
2. Data Portability and the Availability of Information From New Generation Firms 
 
¶49 Part of Microsoft’s settlement agreement called for Microsoft to make available to 
developers essential information about Windows so that they could more freely develop 
applications for Windows.130  This part of the consent decree was driven by the 
allegations that Microsoft was abusing its control over the platform to influence the 
development that was being done for it, and ultimately to sustain its monopoly.131  
However, contrary to such a strategy, Facebook has affirmatively made helpful 
information available to developers including tools to make development more 
convenient.132  In fact, Facebook invites anyone interested to “join the development 
community.”133
 
128  Facebook Application Directory, For your Desktop, 
http://www.facebook.com/apps/index.php?type=1&sort=2 (last visited Apr. 11, 2010). 
129  Scott Karp, Facebook Beacon: A Cautionary Tale, PUBLISHING 2.0, Dec. 1, 2007, 
http://publishing2.com/2007/12/01/facebook-beacon-a-cautionary-tale-about-new-media-monopolies/. 
130 See supra Part III.D. 
131 See supra Part III.D.  The allegations against Microsoft under Sherman Act II were generally directed 
to Microsoft’s alleged attempt to maintain its monopoly in the computer operating system market. 
132 Facebook Developers, http://developers.facebook.com/. 
   
133 Id (“The web is social. Developers just like you have built applications on Facebook Platform that 
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¶50 The divergence of these two opposing strategies is illustrative of a core difference 
between the economics of Microsoft and Facebook.  Microsoft had a strong interest in 
controlling the nature of the products that became popular for use on its platform 
because, at least in-part, (1) the control enabled them to ensure Windows’ position as the 
dominant platform and (2) Microsoft could profit from the development and sale of such 
applications itself.  Facebook, however, is not incentivized to exert such control over 
application development because, among other reasons, (1) development of third party 
applications is a less significant aspect of ensuring Facebook’s position as a dominant 
platform,134
¶51 Therefore, Facebook is generally indifferent as to who developed a particular 
application.  Because the applications are free, Facebook essentially captures all the value 
of a successful application that it is interested in (the traffic it drives to the site) whether it 
was developed by Facebook or not.  Although there is less interest in controlling the path 
of development of applications, Facebook may be more concerned with other significant 
elements of ensuring its position as a dominant platform.   
 and (2) the dominant business model of web applications is that they are 
made available for free. 
¶52 In the social networking space, the network effect manifests itself in a similar way 
to the operating system space in that the more users of the platform there are, the higher 
the switching costs, the greater the network externalities, and the more benefit to using 
the platform for users.  Thus, users of a particular social networking platform will be 
exponentially disincentivized from using an alternative as the social networking platform 
gains more users.   However, Facebook’s true customers are advertisers.  This represents 
a marked difference from Microsoft’s business model.  In that sense, the true product 
Facebook brings to the “market” is not its technology, but the social information about, 
and access to, its vast user base.  Information about and access to users is what makes 
Facebook valuable to advertisers.  As one might expect, Facebook has already 
demonstrated an unwillingness to make this information freely available.135
3. Microsoft, Facebook, and the Availability of Essential Information 
 
¶53 An identification of user information as a core asset of Facebook, and potentially of 
many other new generation firms, highlights an additional way that antitrust analysis of 
high technology firms should be adapted.  In the Microsoft case, the government likely 
got it right by forcing Microsoft to make important elements of their technology open for 
developers.  However, to that end, future regulators must be willing to look beyond the 
underlying technology to identify ways in which a dominant high-technology firm may 
maintain monopoly control.  Specifically, as Facebook begins to accumulate more and 
more information about how users behave, they will be able to develop the platform in 
 
millions of people use every day.  Join our developer community and help make the web even more 
social.”). 
134 Although the functionality of Windows itself is important, users also choose Windows for what it 
enables them to do with other software.  In contrast, and in addition to the platform itself, users like 
Facebook, at least in significant part, because it enables social networking.  In short, the network effect is 
actively sought by Facebook users and easily recognized as a primary and direct benefit. 
135 Scott Gilbertson, Google and Facebook Join the Data Portability Debate, Jan. 9, 2008, 
http://www.webmonkey.com/2008/01/google_and_facebook_to_join_the_data_portability_debate/ (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2010) . 
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such a way to take advantage of that knowledge, and that knowledge will create a larger 
and larger barrier to entry for potential competitors.  It is noteworthy that the barrier is 
not necessarily the result of technological blocking but more the result of informational 
blocking. 
¶54 Regulators must be especially aware of this potentially new form of barrier to entry 
given the apparently “open” nature of the Facebook platform in that Facebook is making 
code freely available and inviting everyone to develop.  At the surface level Facebook is 
avoiding Microsoft’s great sin of shutting out competitors from their underlying 
technology.136
 
  At the same time, however, there is great potential that Facebook could 
achieve effectively the same barrier to entry that Microsoft was found liable of upholding 
by preventing access to the additional information that is needed by developers if they are 
to compete in any reasonable fashion.  To truly enable competition regulators will have to 
ensure that the relevant tools, information regarding the vast user base, are available to 
potential competitors. 
V. DOES MICROSOFT MAKE SENSE TODAY? 
¶55 A retrospective evaluation of the Microsoft antitrust case reveals that much value 
was gained from the awareness raised regarding the difficulties of antitrust regulation in 
the new economy.  However, it also makes clear that the Microsoft case did not provide a 
structure for antitrust regulation that can be rigidly or faithfully applied to antitrust 
analyses of all high-technology companies.  As one example, it is likely that the 
government got some things wrong such as narrowly defining the market with respect to 
the underlying technology.  It is clear how this could pose problems in future analyses as 
it may have with the Google-Yahoo deal.  It is clear that the Microsoft case did not even 
address all the potential antitrust considerations that will arise with relation to New 
Generation Firms.  This is clear given the potential antitrust concerns related to data 
portability with Facebook.  In conclusion, courts and regulators must be willing to 
recognize the way that technology can influence antitrust analyses, without losing sight 
of the ultimate goal: fostering competition.  
 
136 Beyond Facebook’s presumed desire to maintain control over user information, privacy concerns 
may also result in a significant barrier to making user information freely available. See id.  This concept 
may be thought of as an extension of Professor Lessig’s concern that anticompetitive behavior may be 
more easily accomplished with respect to software (in this case, software related information), than it 
would be by traditional contracts or business means.  See supra Part II.B. 
